Choosing one’s defence teeth carefully

The second defence budget presented by the BJP-led government has not been very well received in the armed forces circle for the meager hike in allocation of funds for modernization that the three services of India, which they are in dire need of. The budget presented by Finance Minister Arun Jaitley saw not so impressive 7.9 per cent rise in the defence allocation for the year 2015-16. In a developing country, where the proverbial debate of bullet versus bread is constantly on, it calls for a sharper military strategy and a modernization in commensuration of it.

In the recent years, India has emerged as one of the largest arms importer in the world causing a considerable burden on its foreign reserves as the indigenous production failed to showcase any decent weaponry since independence. According to the international database put together by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute the volume of Indian imports of major weapons rose by 111 per cent between 2004–08 and 2009–13, and its share of the volume of international arms imports increased from 7 to 14 per cent. In 2014 India’s arms imports became almost 3 times as high as those of the second and third largest arms importers—China and Pakistan. While there is no denying the fact that the modernization pace of the Indian armed forces has been sluggish leaving much room for improvement, there does not seem to be a coherent thought to shape the country’s military strategy. The armed forces are gearing up for fighting a two-and-a-half front war, but what will be its military objective in case it comes to an armed resolution of conflict with either Pakistan or China; or both the countries at one go and the asymmetric warfare of which India has long been a target.

Scenario one is when India chooses a military option against Pakistan. The question that needs to be answered is - in response to what provocation will Indian establishment be willing to use military force against its neighbor in the West? Even Parliament Attack and Mumbai Attack did not seem to be a good enough reason to opt for a military conflagration. And in case India goes for this option what will be its military objective – to capture Pakistani territory and how far can India go in its military retribution without provoking a nuclear strike from Islamabad. There will be very few military experts who will deny that the option of a full scare conventional war with Pakistan is no longer available.  

The second scenario can unfold in the eastern sector. The other major reason for consternation among the Indian defence mandarins has been growth of an assertive China in the east. Is India choosing for a number parity with China? This would be impossible considering the sheer size of both economies. India’s main aim would be to have a credible deterrence both in the conventional and nuclear sphere of warfare. Also, India needs to decide to what extent it will go to play a balancing against china in the region. Will the Indian armed forces need long distance nuclear-tipped missiles to develop this counter-weight against China or will that role be fulfilled by more fighter jets? Questions like these need to be answered before going for new acquisitions to be done with futuristic requirements.

Both the scenarios the main role that India is envisaging for its armed is one that of a defensive force instead of being an aggressor. The last extensive assessment of the capabilities and projected modernization was carried out post-1999 Kargil conflict and in 2002 by the Naresh Chandra committee. In the piles of recommendations given at both the times a concrete action plan for reforming the Indian armed forces and their expected role was lost in rhetoric.

The armed forces have always complained for not been given a space on the decision making table of the Indian security establishment, but they also need to put their own house in order as well. The inter-service rivalry has so far meant that the post of the permanent Chief of Defence Staff, a sort of Super-General who can act as one point advice source for the civil authorities on defence matter and to increase co-ordination among the three services, is still to fructify. The other hindrance to the establishment of a permanent CDS is the discomfort in the Government dispensation with so much power vested in one military person and the devaluing of the Cabinet Secretary. The result is overlapping demands from the three forces. The brazen case in point is the Indian Army’s demand to raise a mini-air force comprising of attack helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for its use, a demand that the Indian Air Force has strongly objected to. The other drawback of the lack of coordination is the failure to acknowledge the best practices followed by ‘sister’ services. The Indian Navy’s indigenization efforts executed in close cooperation with the public and private sector undertakings has by far proved to be the most efficient of the three forces as India embarked on ambitious projects to construct nuclear-attack submarines and aircraft carriers at much cheaper price and gaining more self-reliance. But the other two forces continue to be heavily dependent on imports for most items on their wish list.

The Indian defence budget earmarked for the fiscal year 2015-16 at $40.07 billion (only 40 percent of this will be available for acquisition purposes) indicates that not everything on the wish list of the armed forces will be given to them. So it calls for prioritization of requirements. Also the BJP government needs to not to be too complacent regarding its defence preparedness or a disaster like Kargil will be cause of much ignominy.      

Submarine Arm – Achilles Heel for the Indian Navy

Submarine arm is for the Indian Navy, what MiGs have been for the Indian Air Force (IAF) off late – the Achilles Heel – the chink in its armoury. Talking about sheer statistics, the Indian Navy last inducted a conventional submarine 19 years ago and its current fleet is down to 13 in number.

 

The resignation of the Indian Navy Chief Admiral DK Joshi and the government’s blatant eagerness to accept it following the spate of accidents faced by the Indian Navy’s submarine fleet point to a chronic problem in the Indian defence establishment – Armed Forces propose, MoD disposes. Despite the alarming situation of the Indian submarine fleet getting archaic and the Indian Navy seeking to maintain its edge in the Indian Ocean Region (in the face of the expanding submarine fleet of China and a strong submarine arm of Pakistan) proposing new acquisition, MoD kept dragging its feet.

In 2010 the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) sounded the red herring saying that the navy’s submarine fleet was ageing and by 2012 63 percent of its vessels would have completed their operational life. The report underlined the “serious slippages” in the induction plan as the genesis of the problem. "In what could seriously impact on the operational preparedness of the Indian Navy, more than 50 per cent of its submarines have completed 75 per cent of their operational life and some have already outlived their maximum service life."

With a number of platforms due for retirement, by 2015, the Indian submarine fleet is projected to be down to 10 underwater platforms. In contrast have the biggest navy in Asia China is known to have 8-10 nuclear powered submarines and 50-60 diesel submarines. Beijing is also actively aiding Islamabad in augmenting its fleet by constructing submarines for them.

The prophecy of the CAG seems to be eerily close as the Indian Navy submarines suffered three accidents – causing loss of lives and machines, as well.

The indigenous construction of the Scorpene submarines is already way behind the schedule, marred by constant allegations about corruption in the deal. The government is yet to sanction the construction of submarines under the Project P-75 I.

Indian Navy Chief resigns

In the wake of the today's accident onboard INS Sindhuratna, Indian Navy Chief Admiral DK Joshi resigned. Here is the statement issued by the Ministry of Defence- 

"Taking moral responsibility for the accidents and incidents which have taken place during the past few months, the Chief of Naval Staff Admiral DK Joshi today resigned from the post of CNS.

The Government has accepted the resignation of Admiral Joshi with immediate effect.

The Vice Chief of Naval Staff Vice Admiral RK Dhowan will be discharging the duties of officiating CNS, pending appointment of regular CNS."

Aiming without Arming

The Indian defence establishment has been talking about a grown assertiveness in its dealing with its giant neighbor in the East – China. Two separate developments earlier this month marked a sense of maturity in the defence outlook of India – the Special Representatives talks on the boundary issue with China and the largest edition of Milan naval exercise with 16 countries from the Indian Ocean Region and South China Sea.

On the face of it the two events look unrelated, but Indian Mandarins in the South Block seem to have taken a leaf out from the Chinese strategy of seeking a peaceful resolution of disputes while continuing to assert its might. India conducted war games with 16 countries including Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand – which are having disputes with China in the South China Sea region - in the Bay of Bengal from Feb 4-9. And then Indian National Security Advisor (NSA) met China’s State Councillor Yang Jiechi to decide to start dialogue on maritime security, an important aspect of Indo-China relations considering their rivalry vis-à-vis energy security.

File Photo of Exercise Milan

The only difference between the strategic maneuvering of the two countries is that China can actually back them up with firepower. India seems to be aiming virtually with no gun. The gap between the requirements of the Indian Armed Forces and the grant from the government is ever widening – as reflected in the recent budget. On the face of it, the defence budget has got a 10 percent hike. But probe a bit deeper, and it reflects an Indian defence establishment, known to have inertia to change; acquisition process takes decades, any force augmentations come after years, domination of reactive rather proactive approach towards bulwarking its defence and so forth and so on.

The announced Defence Budget for the year 2014-15 is 2.24 trillion rupees. The major reason for the enhanced budget is the increased pay and salaries of the three forces and the hiked revenue expenditure of the Indian Army, which is raising a Mountain Strike Corps along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) along China. However, the other requirements like getting new artillery guns have been hanging fire. And also the IAF had to bear a cut in relation to the current year.

Indian Defence Minister AK Antony dropped the bombshell at the flagship biennial Indian defence exhibition DefExpo-2014, that there was no money for the purchase of the 126 Medium Multi-Role Aircraft (MMRCA) for the Indian Air Force (IAF) – an acquisition that has the force has been awaiting for nearly a decade now and the delay has been keeping it from bidding adieu to all variants of the MiG-21s.

India has been trying to hide behind the comforts of its ‘superior’ navy with a greater experience of projecting force beyond its border. The Indian Navy officials have been boasting about the successful operation of a flat-deck carrier for decades. A claim which has been bolstered by the recent addition of Admiral Gorshkov, rechristened as INS Vikramaditya, in its fleet. The Chinese Navy that recently acquired Soviet-vintage aircraft carrier Varyag is already working towards acquiring second such warship. India presently has two aircraft carriers – one of which will be retiring soon and will be replaced by an indigenous one. And the Indian defence establishment instead of taking honing this indigenous capability further and sanctioning the construction of the second aircraft carrier is bidding time.

Another crunch staring the Indian Navy in face is the rapidly dwindling numbers of its submarines. The force has been left with only 14 conventional submarines in its flotilla and it is only after considerable delay that the government has decided to give its nod to the construction of six submarines under Project-75 I.

Another major project in limbo has been the construction of six strategic rail links along the LAC. The Indian Army had initially proposed construction of 14 strategic lines in Ladakh and North Eastern Regions. Out of this six lines were accorded top priority by the MoD. These lines will entail an estimated cost of Rs. 80,000 crore.

The rail lines are as such important to link the two regions with the country, however, the inaction on the part of the Indian government becomes more glaring as China has already laid down 10,000 km long rail network in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). This has given China the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) the capability to mobilize 4,50,000 soldiers to the border in 30 days.  Some of the important railway projects in North East are Missamari (Assam) to Tawang (Arunachal Pradesh), North Lakhimpur (Assam) to Along (Arunachal Pradesh) and Murkongselek (Assam)-Pasighat (Arunachal Pradesh). Tawang is strategically important to India and is one region in the North east claimed by the Chinese. Inclement weather in the region makes it difficult to maintain supply routes. 

While the Defence Minister has received a pat on his back for managing to spend every penny of the defence budget during his tenure, the last year 2013-14 has been very lackluster on his resume.