Choosing one’s defence teeth carefully

The second defence budget presented by the BJP-led government has not been very well received in the armed forces circle for the meager hike in allocation of funds for modernization that the three services of India, which they are in dire need of. The budget presented by Finance Minister Arun Jaitley saw not so impressive 7.9 per cent rise in the defence allocation for the year 2015-16. In a developing country, where the proverbial debate of bullet versus bread is constantly on, it calls for a sharper military strategy and a modernization in commensuration of it.

In the recent years, India has emerged as one of the largest arms importer in the world causing a considerable burden on its foreign reserves as the indigenous production failed to showcase any decent weaponry since independence. According to the international database put together by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute the volume of Indian imports of major weapons rose by 111 per cent between 2004–08 and 2009–13, and its share of the volume of international arms imports increased from 7 to 14 per cent. In 2014 India’s arms imports became almost 3 times as high as those of the second and third largest arms importers—China and Pakistan. While there is no denying the fact that the modernization pace of the Indian armed forces has been sluggish leaving much room for improvement, there does not seem to be a coherent thought to shape the country’s military strategy. The armed forces are gearing up for fighting a two-and-a-half front war, but what will be its military objective in case it comes to an armed resolution of conflict with either Pakistan or China; or both the countries at one go and the asymmetric warfare of which India has long been a target.

Scenario one is when India chooses a military option against Pakistan. The question that needs to be answered is - in response to what provocation will Indian establishment be willing to use military force against its neighbor in the West? Even Parliament Attack and Mumbai Attack did not seem to be a good enough reason to opt for a military conflagration. And in case India goes for this option what will be its military objective – to capture Pakistani territory and how far can India go in its military retribution without provoking a nuclear strike from Islamabad. There will be very few military experts who will deny that the option of a full scare conventional war with Pakistan is no longer available.  

The second scenario can unfold in the eastern sector. The other major reason for consternation among the Indian defence mandarins has been growth of an assertive China in the east. Is India choosing for a number parity with China? This would be impossible considering the sheer size of both economies. India’s main aim would be to have a credible deterrence both in the conventional and nuclear sphere of warfare. Also, India needs to decide to what extent it will go to play a balancing against china in the region. Will the Indian armed forces need long distance nuclear-tipped missiles to develop this counter-weight against China or will that role be fulfilled by more fighter jets? Questions like these need to be answered before going for new acquisitions to be done with futuristic requirements.

Both the scenarios the main role that India is envisaging for its armed is one that of a defensive force instead of being an aggressor. The last extensive assessment of the capabilities and projected modernization was carried out post-1999 Kargil conflict and in 2002 by the Naresh Chandra committee. In the piles of recommendations given at both the times a concrete action plan for reforming the Indian armed forces and their expected role was lost in rhetoric.

The armed forces have always complained for not been given a space on the decision making table of the Indian security establishment, but they also need to put their own house in order as well. The inter-service rivalry has so far meant that the post of the permanent Chief of Defence Staff, a sort of Super-General who can act as one point advice source for the civil authorities on defence matter and to increase co-ordination among the three services, is still to fructify. The other hindrance to the establishment of a permanent CDS is the discomfort in the Government dispensation with so much power vested in one military person and the devaluing of the Cabinet Secretary. The result is overlapping demands from the three forces. The brazen case in point is the Indian Army’s demand to raise a mini-air force comprising of attack helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for its use, a demand that the Indian Air Force has strongly objected to. The other drawback of the lack of coordination is the failure to acknowledge the best practices followed by ‘sister’ services. The Indian Navy’s indigenization efforts executed in close cooperation with the public and private sector undertakings has by far proved to be the most efficient of the three forces as India embarked on ambitious projects to construct nuclear-attack submarines and aircraft carriers at much cheaper price and gaining more self-reliance. But the other two forces continue to be heavily dependent on imports for most items on their wish list.

The Indian defence budget earmarked for the fiscal year 2015-16 at $40.07 billion (only 40 percent of this will be available for acquisition purposes) indicates that not everything on the wish list of the armed forces will be given to them. So it calls for prioritization of requirements. Also the BJP government needs to not to be too complacent regarding its defence preparedness or a disaster like Kargil will be cause of much ignominy.