By Admiral Arun Prakash, former Chief of Indian Navy
"Instead of merely moaning about China’s ‘string of pearls’ and ‘maritime silk route’ strategies, India needs to craft creative, dynamic and long-term maritime alternatives.”
December 26, 2004, Sunday morning, saw the calm in Naval Headquarters (NHQ) being shattered by ominous reports of powerful seismic shocks and giant tidal surges in our Bay of Bengal islands and coastal areas. As the first Indian Navy (IN) warships and aircraft were being despatched on relief missions, appeals for assistance started coming from Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Having assigned resources to cope with the domestic emergency, NHQ considered it equally imperative to rush aid to stricken neighbours.
Given the languid functioning of our bureaucracy, a proposal of this nature could have taken weeks or months to be processed by the ministries of defence, external affairs and finance. To one’s utter amazement, the national security adviser (NSA) accorded instant approval on the phone, with the words, “We will sort out the paperwork on Monday”. Eighteen hours later, citizens of Galle on the southern tip of Sri Lanka awoke to see Indian warships, laden with relief material, anchored off the devastated harbour.
Fast-forward to December 1, 2014 — a decade. I arrive in this picturesque port town for the Galle Dialogue, to be told by a Sri Lankan admiral, “People in Galle remember the tsunami. If you tell shopkeepers that you are from the IN (Indian Navy), they will not let you pay.”
Initiated by the Sri Lankan ministry of defence in 2010, the annual Galle Dialogue has gained in significance and momentum with 38 nations, spanning the full alphabet from Australia to Zambia, represented at its fifth edition. India was given due prominence and the printed programme showed Dr Ajit Doval, India’s NSA, as guest of honour and keynote speaker, with the first two sessions being chaired by Indians; one of them being the vice chief of naval staff (VCNS).
The NSA’s oration on regional maritime security issues was heard with rapt attention and drew applause as he, tactfully, mentioned the early contributions of Sri Lankan statesmen towards creating an Indian Ocean zone of peace. The anti-climax came when it was discovered that the Indian VCNS (Vice Chief of Naval Staff) had not arrived on the expected flight. The hosts, too polite to pose awkward questions, quietly found a substitute to chair the session. The Galle Dialogue 2014, thus, saw participation by the commander of the Pakistan Fleet, the deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA Navy (PLAN) and a dozen other flag officers, but the IN invitee was absent; leaving many questions hanging in the air.
The whispered explanation, when it came, was on entirely predictable lines; apparently, an MoD (Ministry of Defence) functionary had turned down, at the last minute and for reasons unknown, the participation of the VCNS. One felt a sense of déjà vu because the all-powerful and non-accountable MoD bureaucracy has a known penchant for sitting on files till the 11th hour, and then whimsically approving or, more often, rejecting the proposal. It is in the latter context that a recent Indo-Sri Lankan diplomatic spat assumes significance.
During September-October 2014, Chinese submarines, accompanied by support vessels, docked in Colombo Port on two occasions. This peacetime transit and replenishment of a submarine was described, both by the Chinese and the Sri Lankan governments, as “common practice”. According to media reports, India took umbrage and told Colombo that its actions were of “serious concern to India’s national security.”
However, a look at the past would show that the episode called for quiet diplomacy rather than public display of indignation. While Sri Lanka’s victory over the LTTE owes much to many nations, including India, it was China’s military support that stood out for scale and constancy. China maintained bonded warehouses in Galle which supplied arms and ammunition to Sri Lankan forces on demand. Beijing also provided heavy weaponry and fighters; either directly or through a willing Pakistan.
In comparison, India’s military aid to Sri Lanka was slow and sporadic. South Block remained hostage, not only to blackmail by Chennai but also to its own timidity, myopic vision and inertia. A saving grace was the camaraderie, at senior levels, of the Indian and Sri Lankan navies, which enabled them to reach out across Palk Strait in times of need. The IN tsunami-relief operation helped strengthen bonds.
Today, China’s role in transforming this island nation, through massive loans and creation of impressive infrastructure is undeniable. India, on the other hand, has been laggard in assisting Sri Lanka’s development on a significant scale.
In the face of China’s advance into the Indian Ocean, all that India has had to offer, so far, is the vapid nostrum of ‘strategic restraint’. Moreover, the dissonance between MEA, MoD and NHQ has often thwarted the navy’s endeavours to create strong bonds with maritime neighbours. A peripatetic PM Modi is, now, giving strong indications that India’s foreign policy may be acquiring a badly needed grand-strategic underpinning.
A practitioner of realpolitik, Sri Lanka is not above playing one neighbour against the other. But given its client status vis-à-vis China, it may not have had the option of denying entry to PLAN submarines. However, Sri Lanka must not allow itself to become China’s pawn, in total disregard of neighbouring India’s strategic interests.
Countries in our immediate neighbourhood, many of them island nations, seek maritime security; sometimes through direct naval presence, but more often through urgent requests for material aid, training assistance and advice. In this context, rushing supplies of water to the Maldives was a fine gesture, but setting up a de-salination plant will win us far more goodwill.
Instead of merely moaning about China’s “string of pearls” and “maritime silk route” strategies, India needs to craft creative, dynamic and long-term maritime alternatives, like employing its Navy as the potent “instrument of state policy” that it is meant to be.
(The writer is a former Chief of Naval Staff)
"Instead of merely moaning about China’s ‘string of pearls’ and ‘maritime silk route’ strategies, India needs to craft creative, dynamic and long-term maritime alternatives.”
December 26, 2004, Sunday morning, saw the calm in Naval Headquarters (NHQ) being shattered by ominous reports of powerful seismic shocks and giant tidal surges in our Bay of Bengal islands and coastal areas. As the first Indian Navy (IN) warships and aircraft were being despatched on relief missions, appeals for assistance started coming from Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Having assigned resources to cope with the domestic emergency, NHQ considered it equally imperative to rush aid to stricken neighbours.
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| Galle in the year 2014 |
Given the languid functioning of our bureaucracy, a proposal of this nature could have taken weeks or months to be processed by the ministries of defence, external affairs and finance. To one’s utter amazement, the national security adviser (NSA) accorded instant approval on the phone, with the words, “We will sort out the paperwork on Monday”. Eighteen hours later, citizens of Galle on the southern tip of Sri Lanka awoke to see Indian warships, laden with relief material, anchored off the devastated harbour.
Fast-forward to December 1, 2014 — a decade. I arrive in this picturesque port town for the Galle Dialogue, to be told by a Sri Lankan admiral, “People in Galle remember the tsunami. If you tell shopkeepers that you are from the IN (Indian Navy), they will not let you pay.”
Initiated by the Sri Lankan ministry of defence in 2010, the annual Galle Dialogue has gained in significance and momentum with 38 nations, spanning the full alphabet from Australia to Zambia, represented at its fifth edition. India was given due prominence and the printed programme showed Dr Ajit Doval, India’s NSA, as guest of honour and keynote speaker, with the first two sessions being chaired by Indians; one of them being the vice chief of naval staff (VCNS).
The NSA’s oration on regional maritime security issues was heard with rapt attention and drew applause as he, tactfully, mentioned the early contributions of Sri Lankan statesmen towards creating an Indian Ocean zone of peace. The anti-climax came when it was discovered that the Indian VCNS (Vice Chief of Naval Staff) had not arrived on the expected flight. The hosts, too polite to pose awkward questions, quietly found a substitute to chair the session. The Galle Dialogue 2014, thus, saw participation by the commander of the Pakistan Fleet, the deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA Navy (PLAN) and a dozen other flag officers, but the IN invitee was absent; leaving many questions hanging in the air.
The whispered explanation, when it came, was on entirely predictable lines; apparently, an MoD (Ministry of Defence) functionary had turned down, at the last minute and for reasons unknown, the participation of the VCNS. One felt a sense of déjà vu because the all-powerful and non-accountable MoD bureaucracy has a known penchant for sitting on files till the 11th hour, and then whimsically approving or, more often, rejecting the proposal. It is in the latter context that a recent Indo-Sri Lankan diplomatic spat assumes significance.
During September-October 2014, Chinese submarines, accompanied by support vessels, docked in Colombo Port on two occasions. This peacetime transit and replenishment of a submarine was described, both by the Chinese and the Sri Lankan governments, as “common practice”. According to media reports, India took umbrage and told Colombo that its actions were of “serious concern to India’s national security.”
However, a look at the past would show that the episode called for quiet diplomacy rather than public display of indignation. While Sri Lanka’s victory over the LTTE owes much to many nations, including India, it was China’s military support that stood out for scale and constancy. China maintained bonded warehouses in Galle which supplied arms and ammunition to Sri Lankan forces on demand. Beijing also provided heavy weaponry and fighters; either directly or through a willing Pakistan.
In comparison, India’s military aid to Sri Lanka was slow and sporadic. South Block remained hostage, not only to blackmail by Chennai but also to its own timidity, myopic vision and inertia. A saving grace was the camaraderie, at senior levels, of the Indian and Sri Lankan navies, which enabled them to reach out across Palk Strait in times of need. The IN tsunami-relief operation helped strengthen bonds.
Today, China’s role in transforming this island nation, through massive loans and creation of impressive infrastructure is undeniable. India, on the other hand, has been laggard in assisting Sri Lanka’s development on a significant scale.
In the face of China’s advance into the Indian Ocean, all that India has had to offer, so far, is the vapid nostrum of ‘strategic restraint’. Moreover, the dissonance between MEA, MoD and NHQ has often thwarted the navy’s endeavours to create strong bonds with maritime neighbours. A peripatetic PM Modi is, now, giving strong indications that India’s foreign policy may be acquiring a badly needed grand-strategic underpinning.
A practitioner of realpolitik, Sri Lanka is not above playing one neighbour against the other. But given its client status vis-à-vis China, it may not have had the option of denying entry to PLAN submarines. However, Sri Lanka must not allow itself to become China’s pawn, in total disregard of neighbouring India’s strategic interests.
 |
| The nothern-most tip of Sri Lanka in Jaffna.India is saddled just across the narrow Palk Strait. |
Countries in our immediate neighbourhood, many of them island nations, seek maritime security; sometimes through direct naval presence, but more often through urgent requests for material aid, training assistance and advice. In this context, rushing supplies of water to the Maldives was a fine gesture, but setting up a de-salination plant will win us far more goodwill.
Instead of merely moaning about China’s “string of pearls” and “maritime silk route” strategies, India needs to craft creative, dynamic and long-term maritime alternatives, like employing its Navy as the potent “instrument of state policy” that it is meant to be.
(The writer is a former Chief of Naval Staff)
