INTRODUCTION
Sixty-six years after independence, the peace in the Valley
of Kashmir continues to be fragile. The dispute involving the only
Muslim-majority state in the country – Jammu and Kashmir – has been a common
thread in the Master Narratives of Indian politics – the Hindu Nationalism, the
Muslim political identity and the Secularist discourse.
The Kashmir dispute is a heady mix of contentions along
ethnic, religious and territorial lines, irredentism, hyper-nationalism and;
interstate and intrastate conflict. The movement in the Kashmir that has its
genesis in 1931 owing to the unequal relationship between the ruler (the Hindu
Dogra King) and the ruled (a poor Muslim Peasantry), over a period of time
aligned itself along the communal lines (Talbot, 1949). The Indian secularists
considered the state’s accession to the Union of India as imperative for the
four pillars of the its foundation – Secularism, Democracy, Federalism and
Nationalism (Ganguly and Bajpai, 1994). Pakistan, on the other hand, staked its
irredentist claim on Kashmir as a Muslim-majority territory contiguous to it.
The vigour of Pakistan’s claim increased more so after East Pakistan broke off
in 1971 to form Bangladesh, discrediting the very idea of Pakistan as the home
to the South Asian Muslims.
It is accepted that it was not the differences between the
two religions – Hinduism and Islam – that resulted in communalism but “communal
politics and ideological practices that transformed religious differentiation
into communal cleavage” (Chandra, 1996 and (Brown,
1997). But the failure of the ‘secular-nationalist’ forces to deal with the
communal problem despite its commitment to secularism and national unity, in
the pre-independence country played an instrumental role in the rise of
communalism. Also, the rise of political self-consciousness among the elites in
the second largest community in the country – that has been rulers of the
country during what is popularly termed as the Mughal Era suddenly projected
itself as minorities (Akbar, 2011) - led to the partition of the country into
India and Pakistan.
The bloodshed that ensued partition bequeathed
both the countries with a heavy burden of the past. And, as Muslims projected
themselves as National Minority – a political stance to claim certain
collective cultural or political rights – they created a triadic nexus between
India-Pakistan and the Muslim community (Bowem, 2002). This triadic nexus also
got extrapolated in the politics of Kashmir and the players involved – India
and Pakistan – got bound by their intractable positions and the clamour for
independence gets stronger among Kashmiri Muslims.
Further, the manifestation of the Kashmir
dispute along religious lines has bolstered the strength of the Hindu
nationalists across the country, who have pinned the issue to the question of
the loyalty of Muslim community as a whole towards India (Varshney, 1991).
While it is absolutely fallacious to assume Muslims as ‘homogenous’ entity,
what cannot be ignored is that modernity has increased the political
consciousness and widened the boundaries communities encompassing masses
cutting across geographical boundaries (Chandra, 1996). For India, a polyethnic
society that embarked on the process of nation-building only 67 years ago,
Kashmir’s ‘inalienable’ association with it is an important part of its
Nationalism – defined as a set of ideas, both learned and manipulated (Bowem,
2002).
The Essay will be an examination of the role
played by the Kashmir dispute outside the state of Jammu and Kashmir
formulating the larger discourse between communal forces from both the Hindu
and Muslim Communities. The paper will deliberate on the impact of the Kashmir
Conflict on the Muslim Identity in the rest of the India using Rogers
Brubaker’s triadic configuration of nationalizing states, national minorities
and external national homelands, to explain why issue of Kashmir remains one of
the biggest bones of contention between the Hindus and Muslims. The model of
‘the Macedonian Syndrome’ will also be discussed to explain the situation. The
schism between the two communities remain starkly crystalised and wide on the
contrary to that with the Sikh community, which had also witnessed in 1980’s
waged a fairly violent secessionist movement for Khalistan.
Within the state of Jammu and Kashmir there has
been heavily polarized today like not time in history, as evident from the mass
protests of Hindus and Muslims that arose following the Amarnath Yatra Land
transfer issue in 2008 (Tremblay, 2009). The Kashmiri Pandits (Hindus) continue
to be in exile since their exodus from the Valley of Kashmir in 1990, the
generation of Kashmir Muslims since then has grown without any memory of
co-existence with other community. Moreover, the Hindus of the Jammu region for
long have been grieving against the social, economic and political partisan politics
played by the politicians of Kashmir. Seeing no future outside the Union of
India and; fearing subjugation and meeting same fate as Kashmiri Pandits in a
Muslim-majority-independent Jammu and Kashmir, the Hindus in the Jammu region
rose up in an uprising in reaction to the Kashmiri Muslims agitation against
the transfer of 99 acres of land of Amarnath Hindu Shrine Board.
HISTORY OF KASHMIR
The history and context of Jammu-Kashmir played
an important role in shaping the development of events in the Valley. Islam was
not brought to Kashmir by attackers and the people were not converted at gun
point. Rather, the people willingly converted and started following the Sufism
strand of Islam. The Islam practiced in the Kashmir valley differs from the one
practiced in the rest of the country and also in Pakistan. It was this
difference that gave the Valley its clarion call for freedom in the name of
Kashmiriyat – a set of values it shared amongst its residents. However, it was
the context and demography of the state that eventually necessitated the use of
religion (Sharma, 1985).
At the time of independence, the Hindu ruler of
the Muslim-majority state signed the Instrument of Accession with India on
October 26, 1947, in lieu of the New Delhi’s military support against the
Pakistan-backed tribesmen from the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP). The
tribesmen had attacked Jammu and Kashmir to forcibly liberate the Muslims of
Kashmir. The subjects of Hari Singh, who
have started an uprising in 1931, under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah
accepted the Instrument of Accession along with the assurance of the Indian
government to protect the autonomy of the state. By November 1947, both India
and Pakistan formulated public positions that would make difficult for both of
them to retreat (Lamb, 1993).
In making the decision to accede to New Delhi,
Sheikh Abdullah identified more similarity between the basic tenets of the Idea
of India that is Secularism and Kashmiriyat. Nearly a year after Jammu and
Kashmir leader Sheikh Abdullah defended India’s stand in his speech in the UN
Security Council Meeting by saying: “It was because I and my organization never believed in the formula
that Muslims and Hindus form separate nations. We do not believe in the
two-nation theory, nor in communal hatred or communalism itself. We believed
that religion had no place in politics. Therefore, when we launched our
movement of ‘Quit Kashmir’ it was not only Muslims who suffered, but our Hindu
and Sikh comrades as well.”
In popular imagination, the dispute of Kashmir
is all about the ‘cohesive and homogenous’ people of a shared ethnicity seeking
the right of self-determination. But presently the assumed cohesiveness and
homogeneity of the populace of Jammu and Kashmir is contrary to the ground
reality. The religion-wise
breakup of the population as per the 2001 census showed that the Muslims
constituted the predominant religious community of the state at 67 percent,
Hindus came next at 29.6 percent, Sikhs 2.23 percent, Buddhists 1.16 percent,
Christians 0.14 percent, and others form the remaining part.
The population was also divided into three main geographical regions
of Hindu majority Jammu,
Muslim-dominated Kashmir Valley and Buddhist-populated Ladakh. While the denial
of the right of self-determination has led to the alienation of the population
of Kashmir Valley, the neglect of the other communities socially, economically
and politically – Hindus and Buddhists - have created schism between Jammu and
Ladakh’s relations with the state government-based in Kashmir. The situation
can be summed up that contrary to the assumption of Kashmiris being a
‘homogenous, monolithic’ group; it has many small communities each striving for
a better socio-economic development and a political space for itself (Behra,
2006). This mistaken impression often results in assessing the relation of only
the Kashmir valley with the Indian state and not that of the whole state of
Jammu and Kashmir.
On one hand, the continuous encroachment of the
Indian government of the promised autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir and the
meddling with political institutions in the valley has alienated the now
educated and better informed youth of the valley (Ganguly, 1996). The rise of
insurgency in Kashmir found an ally in the radicalisaition taking place in
Pakistan. On the other hand, the constant refusal of the Kashmir-Muslim headed
government to share power with other communities forced Jammu and Ladakh
regions to seek a greater integration with India (Behra, 2006). This
eventually- led the leaders of Kashmir to seek a separate homeland for the
Kashmiri Muslims – which constitute nearly 99 percent of the population of the
Kashmir Valley after Kashmiri Pandits were driven out by the violent campaign
against them in 1990 by militants. The crystallized divisions became evident in
2008 as the protests of the Kashmir Muslims against the land transfer to the
Hindu Amarnath Shrine Board were met with not only equal but more vocal
protests by the Hindu in Jammu Region.
In a nutshell initially the Kashmiris – both
Hindus and Muslims- had considered themselves vitally different from their
counterparts in the rest of the country. But, the movement that started against
the “unequal relationship” between the rulers and the ruled that gave way to
communal bias as “political consciousness spread to Kashmir.
INDIA, KASHMIR DISPUTE
AND THE MUSLIM IDENTITY
The idea of nation itself has undergone a sea
change and today nations can be accepted as a set of ideas around which an
identity is being constructed to define who belongs to the country and who do
not. But for India the restructuring of nationalism took place just at
independence as Pakistan was carved out as Muslim Homeland. India instead of
choosing the nationality of race decided to opt for the nationality of
territory cutting across religions (Varshney, 2002) and was home to nearly 13
percent of Muslims at the time of independence.
Despite the narrative of secular nationalism
derives its power form the Constitution of India, the Hindu-Muslim cleavage had
never healed in the post-independent India in the presence of the nationalizing
host state of India, presence of national minority of Muslims, in whose name an
external national homeland was claimed in 1947 in the name of Pakistan
(Brubaker, 1996). And the revival of Kashmiri freedom movement aided by the
insurgency from across the Line of Control dividing India and Pakistan (Swami,
2007) considerably shaped the Muslim Identity in the rest of the India as well.
Symbol selection and manipulation by politically active elites of both Hindus
and Muslim communities have shaped the Muslim Identity in the country (Copland,
2014) and Kashmir has been an important symbol that has epitomized this
struggle.
The predicaments of the Muslims in the rest of
India owing to the Pakistan’s intervention in Kashmir were duly expressed by a
group of non-Kashmiri Muslims in a Memorandum to the United Nations in 1951.
Signed by 14 distinguished Indian Muslims of that time, the memorandum
questioned Pakistan’s constant announcement about their “determination to
protect and safeguard the interests of Muslims in India”. “This naturally aroused suspicion amongst the
Hindus against us and our loyalty to India was questioned,” said the
memorandum. Regarding Kashmir and its impact on the fortune of Muslims it said:
“In its oft-proclaimed anxiety to rescue the 3 million Muslims from what it
describes as the tyranny of a handful of Hindus in the State (Jammu and
Kashmir), Pakistan evidently is prepared to sacrifice the interests of 40
million Muslims in India - a strange exhibition of concern for the welfare of
fellow Muslims. Our misguided brothers in Pakistan do not realise that if
Muslims in Pakistan can wage a war against Hindus in Kashmir why should not
Hindus, sooner or later, retaliate against Muslims in India?”
At the same time failing to gain support of the
minority communities of Hindus and Buddhists in Jammu and Kashmir, the leaders
of Kashmiri Muslims, even Sheikh Abdullah, pitted the movement against the
subversion of the right of the self-determination of the Muslim-dominated
Kashmir by the Hindu-majority India(Varshney,1991). The divide along communal
lines became more evident during the summer of 2008 as the whole valley broke
out in agitation and a stone-pelting population was dealt with heavy hand by
security forces. Booker Prize winner and political activist Arundhati Roy talking against the Indian occupation in the
Valley in her Essay said: “It allows Hindu chauvinists to target and victimise
Muslims in India by holding them hostage to the freedom struggle being waged by
Muslims in Kashmir.”
Many scholars, including Samuel Huntington, have pointed out that the
economic modernization generates a politically conscious community that seeks
greater opportunities for physical, social and economic mobility. Others have
also identified that in most of the contemporary poly-ethnic societies
developmental needs expressed in terms of cultural values, human rights and
security (Brown, 1997). This could not
be more evident in the situation of the Kashmir Valley. A close scrutiny of the
situation shows that the employment among the youth remains abysmally low, in
stark resemblance of the situation for the majority of the population during
the rule of the Hindu Dogra King (Ganguly, 1996).
Just like the Valley of Kashmir many secessionist movement was waged
in Punjab. The economically strong backbone of Punjab helped it bounce back as
opposed to Kashmir where one crop season and the militancy had destroyed the
economy. Sikhs who have been victims of the carnage of 1984 following the
assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, are performing really well and
are respected across the country. This is in complete contrast to alienation
faced by the Kashmiri Muslims and the aspersion it casts on the Muslim
Community in the country as general.
The antinomies of nationalism of India and Pakistan and the question
of Muslim Identity in India can be extrapolated to the Myron Weiner’s model explaining
‘The Macedonian Syndrome’. The model has three actors - an irredentist state,
an anti-irredentist neighbor, and a shared ethnic group crossing the
international boundary (Weiner, 1971). The ethnic group has to be in minority
in the anti-irredentist neighbor. The situation gets exacerbated as the two
neighbors have a disputed territory. Since Partition Pakistan continues to have
irredentist claims on the Kashmir Valley and the rest of the Muslim population
of the anti-irredentist India. The Muslim being the national minority of the
country is also a key actor in this triadic relation.
The situation can also be understood in the light of the triadic
configuration used by Rogers Brubaker while explaining the National Question in
the New Europe as the boundaries were drawn cutting across communities similar
or different from each other. Brubaker saw the relation between nationalizing
state, national minorities and external homelands. As per this configuration,
nationalizing states are poly-ethnic and are still in the stage of
nation-building making it imperative for them to promote to varying degrees the
language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing or political
hegemony. Then there are self-conscious national minorities striving for
greater cultural or territorial autonomy.
Muslims are the national minority of India and not Sikhs, Jains or
Buddhists. A manifestation of such a demand is embodied in the Kashmiri
Muslim’s demand for more freedom. And the triad is completed by an external
national ‘homelands’ of the minorities. Pakistan on the basis of common
religion with the Muslims of India have been closely monitoring their situation
and closely protest alleged violation of their rights and assert its obligation
to defend their interests. A case in point would be the resolution passed by
the Parliament of Pakistan to denounce the anti-Muslim communal riots in
Gujarat in 2002.
The separatist leaders have been constantly invoking the common
religious thread between Kashmir and Pakistan to assert secession from
India. In 2008 separatist leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani
said during one of the protest that Islam would guide the struggle and that it
was a complete social and moral code that would
govern the people of a free Kashmir. He said Pakistan had been created as the
home of Islam, and that that goal should never be subverted. He said just as
Pakistan belonged to Kashmir, Kashmir belonged to Pakistan (Roy, 2008). It is
such stances of the Kashmiri leader that given fodder to the Hindu chauvinist
outside the Valley and then the ensuing stereotyping of the rest of the Muslims
and their putative nationalism towards Pakistan.
The triangular relationship is also exhibited in the clash of the
informal symbols of nationalism prevalent in the Valley and the formal
nationalism as promoted by the Central Indian government. For instance as the
insurgency started in the Valley in 1990s, celebrations of events associated
with the Indian nationhood such as Independence Day and Republic Day are not celebrated
by the masses. Whereas, the Pakistan backed militant groups designed social
calendars to mobilise the masses and included events like Paksitan’s
Independence Day. In the same fashion, cricket matches between India and
Pakistan served an important political function as the Kashmiris cheer the
Pakistani team. The efforts of the Indian Central government in generating
national symbols have also been thwarted by the exposure of the Kashmiri
population to Pakistan radio and television that have been instrumental in
giving an alternative version of the Kashmir issue and strengthening the
religious bond between Pakistan and the Kashmir Valley. This aided with the
alienation of Kashmiri Muslim masses has put up questions around the legitimacy
of the Indian authority(Tremblay, 1996).
While Pakistan can hardly afford to give formal citizenship to the
Muslims of the country, its continuous monitoring of their situation and
interference in their affairs; and privileges given to the Muslims from the
Kashmir Valley and the rest of the country has given rise to two mutually
antagonistic nationalisms – one towards India and other towards Pakistan. The
recent example has been the suspension of 67 Kashmir Muslim students from a
university in Northern India after they rooted for Pakistani team during a
cricket match on March 3, 2014 and the immediate response from Pakistan and
Pakistan-based terror outfit Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD) separately offering
scholarship to the expelled students highlighted this third party intervention
attempting to exploit the existing fissures in the society.
CONCLUSION
The popular assumption among the masses in India about the “Muslim
Separatism” that got manifested in the partition of the country is that Muslims
had a choice of political identity but they chose one based on religion (Robb,
1991). The assumption got impetus with the turn of events in the Kashmir valley
and the constant irredentist claim of Pakistan.
Under international Law, a state has the right to protect its citizens
even when they live in other states. But they cannot legitimately claim to
protect their ethnic co-nationals leaving in other state and holding the legal
citizenship of that state. While Kashmiris right to strive for
self-determination is indisputable, Pakistan’s irredentist claim on the basis
of a movement that saw a resurgence in 1990s (considerably long time after
Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession with India) complicates
the situation.
Monitoring is the key aspect of the triadic relation and Pakistan-
projecting itself as the homeland of South Asian Muslims – take complete
leverage of that situation. Pakistan backing the movement in Kashmir, can react
back on the nationalizing state that is India, where the minority might be
accused of disloyalty in reaction. Hindu fundamentalists have already been
holding the “attitude of Muslims that Muslims were different from the nation”
as the main reason of the country’s partition (Varshney, 2002). The success of
movement in Kashmir is deemed pernicious for the secular fabric of India and
will have a ‘domino-effect’ in the poly-ethnic society of India.
Pakistan might be exploiting its ethno-religious ties with the Kashmir
valley driven by geo-political reasons. But the idea of Pakistan is under question as it became
the world’s one of the most violent country and not because Hindus are killing
Muslims, but because Muslims are killing Muslims (Cohen, 2012). In such a
scenario, claiming Muslim-majority Kashmir is to strengthen its position as the
home for the Muslims of South Asia.
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